Recent restrictions imposed by YouTube on Russia and Belarus after February 2022 proved to have had the opposite effect, dealing a serious blow to independent creators and media channels. Sanctions have hindered the growth of non-state projects that relied heavily on donations and advertising, limiting their ability to attract audiences and secure independent funding. This has highlighted the issue of resource shortages and made it harder to sustain independent content.
Belarus’ example shows what could happen soon to the Russian segment of YouTube if the situation wouldn’t change and current trends would remain.
State media in Belarus, which have not been sanctioned by the U.S., successfully filled the information vacuum left after Russian propaganda channels were blocked on YouTube, significantly increasing their influence. Over the past three years, these media outlets have demonstrated substantial audience growth: in some cases, view counts have surged nearly 90 times, while subscriber numbers have risen between 2 and 20 times. As of March 2025, Belarusian state TV channels rank among the top ten in terms of views on the platform.
There can certainly be no miracle regarding the return of affection for Lukashenko’s regime and its media resources. Everything is explained by significant financial investments into propaganda and repressive tools of influence, enabling state media’s ability to control information, manipulate public opinion, and suppress alternative sources. All of this resembles George Orwell’s novel "1984," where a totalitarian regime uses propaganda and censorship to construct a false reality and fully control society.
Until February 2022, state media remained in the shadows, with rather modest subscriber numbers and views. However, after Russian state media were blocked on YouTube, Belarusian state media capitalized on the situation by attracting viewers through a large-scale advertising campaign and an influx of the Russian audience. Today, Belarusian state media not only imitates the Kremlin’s propaganda methods but actively justifies Russia's war against Ukraine by spreading narratives favorable to the authorities.
Interestingly, most videos on these channels barely attract a few hundred views, while videos featuring Lukashenko gather millions. This discrepancy is explained by aggressive advertising campaigns promoting his content.
According to eyewitnesses, in the summer of 2020, Alexander Lukashenko reacted painfully to reports that his election opponents were getting more views on YouTube. His bursts of anger and dissatisfaction led him to privately reprimand his press secretary. The situation was corrected through large-scale advertising purchases, repressions against opponents, and the mass labeling of independent media as extremist. In the autumn of 2020, Margarita Simonyan, with financial backing from a songwriter, provided assistance to Lukashenko. She sent a team of employees who helped improve media operations, enhancing propaganda activities and saving the regime amid a political crisis.
Non-state channels primarily targeting audiences within Belarus have shown mixed results over the past three years. NEXTA Live remains the leader among them, but its viewers likely consist of Russian-speaking audiences from various countries.
Some channels faced audience losses (ranging from 2% to 23%), possibly due to stricter Belarusian laws. Hundreds of media resources have been labeled extremist, and subscribing to them can have severe consequences, including fines and, in some cases, imprisonment for up to seven years. Belarusian law enforcement regularly conducts raids to identify subscriptions to banned resources and prosecutes violators. Phone checks occur selectively at border checkpoints. Fearing repression, many residents avoid subscribing to "extremist" YouTube channels but continue watching them without taking risks. Additionally, political fatigue in society has shifted attention toward entertainment content and other topics.
In Russia, content creators can be labeled as "foreign agents," resulting in less severe consequences for viewers. However, given the Kremlin's interest in adopting repressive methods tested in Belarus, it is plausible that Russian authorities may eventually introduce penalties, including fines and arrests, for subscribing to certain channels. YouTube has not yet offered effective solutions to protect viewers from such actions, leaving them vulnerable to persecution.
With declining US funding for media, state media are likely to further solidify their positions. Many Belarusian independent resources will be forced to reduce their activity.
Meanwhile, Russian opposition media (such as Popular Politics, Khodorkovsky LIVE) have seen explosive growth in views (16–18 times), driven by increased interest in alternative information since February 2022.
Yet, the overall audience for independent Russian media on YouTube remains significantly smaller than for state channels, which have extensive resources to disseminate information through various communication channels. Based on statistics from major independent socio-political channels, the audience of regular subscribers is estimated at around 20–25 million, with considerable overlap among these audiences.
By the end of 2024, Russia initiated restrictions and blocked YouTube domestically in response to sanctions against state channels, aiming to isolate the population from uncontrolled information sources. The slowing down of YouTube forced viewers to use VPNs or migrate to Russian platforms. Under these restrictions, some media outlets and bloggers moved to other social networks like Telegram, Instagram, and TikTok. Although this allowed audience expansion, these platforms cannot match YouTube’s capabilities and limit monetization opportunities.
Many YouTube channels have likely reached their growth limit, with further audience expansion only possible through creating higher quality and unique content. Some resources might lose domestic subscribers over time but maintain their positions due to diaspora and international audiences. Their influence in Russia will likely stabilize or decline, similar to what happened with several Belarusian media outlets. However, if YouTube introduces accessible multilingual dubbing tools in the future, it could increase reach by attracting viewers from various countries interested in Russian issues.
Independent channels might experience audience reductions within Russia due to censorship and potential YouTube blocking. Meanwhile, state media have more resources to consolidate influence through alternative platforms (e.g., RuTube and VK Video).
Since 2022, YouTube has imposed several restrictions and sanctions against Russia and Belarus, including suspending monetization for all users and content creators from these countries. This deprived channels of advertising revenue. Bloggers lost their primary income source, significantly affecting independent creators. Due to Russian banks' disconnection from SWIFT, cross-border payments, including withdrawing YouTube earnings through Google AdSense, became impossible.
Additionally, financial sanctions against Russia and Belarus severely hindered channel owners' ability to receive donations. Blocking international payment systems and government sanctions for funding these resources deprived many bloggers and media of revenue opportunities. This resulted in significant financial support losses, impacting their activity, development, and growth. Consequently, some independent voices either left YouTube or significantly reduced their activities, further increasing the dominance of state media.
Bans and blockades of external channels did not reduce the influence of state propaganda but accelerated state content growth by providing propagandistic resources with additional tools for distribution. Meanwhile, independent media and bloggers faced multiple difficulties caused not only by government pressure but also by platform limitations.
For the media in Belarus and Russia, problems include not only access to information but also difficulty inviting speakers who fear repression or other circumstances and thus hesitate to provide comments. This limits the ability to comprehensively cover events and produce objective content, affecting the independence and quality of journalistic materials.
Over the past three years, two parallel worlds have emerged. One exists within Belarusian and Russian propaganda, creating a reality that supports the official agenda. The other is formed by authors, predominantly living in exile, who provide alternative versions of events and perspectives, often under conditions of censorship and repression in their home countries.
